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Sentencing Disparities for Hate Crimes in California
Amilia Sanders
Code Sections Affected
Penal Code § 190.03 (new).
AB 208 (Knox); 1999 STAT; Ch. 566
I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to Chapter 566, a perpetrator of a hate crime who targeted and killed her
victim because of her race, color, religion, nationality, or country of origin received
a more stringent penalty than an individual who targeted her victim because of her
victim's sexual orientation, gender, or disability.' For example, suppose Amanda
intentionally shot her victim because she was Asian American, and Brenda
intentionally shot her victim because she was physically disabled. Assuming that the
victims survived the attacks, both Amanda and Brenda would be subject to penalty
enhancements for targeting a victim who belonged to a protected class of
individuals.2 However, if the victims died as a result of the attacks, only Amanda,
who targeted her victim because of race, would face a mandatory maximum penalty
of death or a mandatory minimum penalty of life in prison without the possibility
of parole.3 Brenda, who targeted her victim because of disability, would face no
such mandatory sentence.4 Instead, the murderer of a disabled victim would face
standard penalties governed by California homicide law including death, life in
prison without the possibility of parole, or anywhere from 25 years to life in prison.5
Introducing Chapter 566, Assemblymember Wally Knox attempts to lessen the
disparity between penalties imposed upon individuals who commit crimes based on
race, color, religion, nationality, or country of origin and those imposed on
1. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190.2(a)(16),422.75(a) (West Supp. 2001).
2. Id. § 422.75(a) (West 1999).
3. See id.§ 190.2(a) (West 1999) (imposing a penalty of death or life in prison without the possibility of
parole if the perpetrator is found guilty of first degree murder and one of the enumerated special circumstances are
found to exist); see also id. § 190.2(a)(16) (West 1999) (imposing a penalty of life in prison without the possibility
of parole or death only if "[t]he victim was intentionally killed because of his or her race, color, religion, nationality,
or country of origin").
4. See infra Part III.A (explaining the state of California homicide and hate crimes law prior to the
enactment of Chapter 566).
5. See id. § 190(a) (West Supp. 2001) (statingthat, "[e]very person guilty of murder in the first degree shall
be punished by death, imprisonment in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole, or imprisonment
in the state prison for a term of 25 years to life").
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individuals who commit crimes based on sexual orientation, gender, or disability.
6
Assemblymember Knox argues that the current disparity in California law sends
potential perpetrators, like Brenda, the message that some individuals are less
valuable than others.7 Chapter 566 imposes a mandatory sentence of life in prison
without the possibility of parole for first degree murders committed because of the
victim's sexual orientation, gender, or disability.8 Thus, both Amanda and Brenda,
in the above example, would be subject to a penalty of life in prison without the
possibility of parole.
While Chapter 566 purports to bring uniformity to California hate crimes law,
opposition to the law does exist.9 Additionally, as with all hate crimes legislation,
concerns about the effect that Chapter 566 may have on individuals' First
Amendment right to free speech also exist.1° However, with the rise in the
commission of hate crimes in California and the impact that hate crimes have on
their victims and minority groups, legislation is needed to convey the message that
hate crimes, no matter who they target, will no longer be tolerated." Chapter 566
effectively punishes hate crimes without chilling free speech by focusing on the
perpetrator's conduct, not thought, and by the inclusion of an express causation
requirement. 12
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Prevalence of Hate Crimes Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender, and
Disability
Violent crimes committed against individuals due to their gender, sexual
orientation, and disability are increasing at an alarming rate.' 3 Approximately 7 out
6. Letter from Wally Knox, Assemblymember, to Governor Gray Davis I (Sept. 8, 1999) [hereinafter
Knox-Davis Letter] (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
7. Id.
8. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.03(a) (enacted by Chapter 566).
9. See infra Part V.B (outlining the opposition of the American Civil Liberties Union and the California
Public Defender's Association to Chapter 566).
10. See infra Part V.D (describing two United States Supreme Court cases, one of which invalidated a hate
crimes statute on First Amendment grounds and the other which rejected a First Amendment challenge to a state
hate crimes statute).
11. See infra Part II.A (describing the rise in the commission of hate crimes in California); see infra Part II.B
(explaining the impact that hate crimes have on their victims, minority groups, and society).
12. See infra Part V.D (explaining that Chapter 566 complies with United States Supreme Court guidelines
for hate crimes statutes by punishing conduct). Additionally, Chapter 566 adopts the California Supreme Court's
interpretation of "because of' requiring the bias motivation to be either the cause in fact or substantial factor in the
commission of the hate crime). Id.
13. See State Action: State Issues: Protecting Citizens from Hates Crimes, available at
www.cfpa.org/issues/hate crimes/talk.cfm (last visited Feb. 1, 2001) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(stating that "[wihile violent crime overall is dropping, hate crimes are on the rise in America. From 1991 to 1995,
reported hate crimes almost doubled from 4,558 to 7,947").
2001 / Crimes
of every 1,000 women in the United States are victims of rape. 4 Additionally, at
least one-fifth of all American women are physically assaulted by a male partner. 15
Furthermore, over one-half of all women murdered in the United States were
murdered by their male partners. 16
Hate crimes against gays are also on the rise, and they are becoming more
violent. 17 Recently, a number of high profile hate crimes against gays have been
brought to light by the media. In October of 1998, Matthew Shepard was beaten,
tied to a fence, and left to die.' 8 Four months later, Billy Jack Gaither was beaten to
death with the handle of an axe and then set on fire.' 9 In March of 1999, Henry
Edward Northington's severed head was placed in a walkway known as a meeting
place for homosexual men.2° In July of 1999, Gary Matson and Winfield Scott
Mowder were shot to death in their bed.2'
Furthermore, one in five lesbian women and one in four gay men in the
Sacramento area has been the victim of a hate crime since their sixteenth birthday.22
Close to 18% of all hate crimes committed in California were committed against
individuals on the basis of their sexual orientation. 23 This number is second only to
hate crimes committed in California on the basis of race or ethnicity.
24
Statistics regarding the number of individuals in the United States who are
victims of crimes due to disability are not widely available. 25 Disability was only
recently added as a category to the Hate Crimes Statistics Act and the Federal
14. See AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION: HATE CRIMES TODAY: AN AGE-OLD FOE IN MODERN
DRESS 10 (1998) [hereinafter Hate Crimes Today] (reporting that 7.2 out of every 1000 women were victims of rape
in 1998); see infra Part V.C. (explaining that although not every act of violence against a woman is a hate crime,
society should rethink its attitude toward completely excluding crimes against woman has even possibly constituting
a hate crime).
15. See Hate Crimes Today (noting that an estimated two million women, at least to 21% of all women are
physically assaulted by a male partner each year); id.
16. See id. (indicating that from 1980 to 1985, 52% of all women murdered in the United States were
murdered by their male partners).
17. See generally Myriam Marquez, Laws Do Little to Protect Gays, SUNDAY GAZETTE-MAIL, July 25, 1999
(citing reports by the National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
18. See generally Slain Student's Mom to Speak at Anti-Hate Rally, CHICAGO TRIB., Sept. 13, 2000 (stating
that Mathew Shepard "was found tied to a fence, brutally beaten and left to die").
19. See generally John Koch, Weak Look at Antigay Attitudes, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 15, 2000 (describing
Billy Jack Gaither's death as "an outtake from 'Goodfellas').
20. See Seattle Gay News Online, Beheading Stuns Gay Community in Virginia, available at www.sgn.org/
Archives/sgn.3.12.99/beheading.htm (last visited Feb. 1,2001) (explaining that Henry Edward Northington's head
was found 'placed squarely in the centerof [a walkway leading to "a popular summertime meeting place for gays"]).
21. See generally Supremacists Accused of Synagogue Arsons, SALT LAKE TRIB., at A7, Mar. 18, 2000
(describing the arrest of two men for shooting Gary Matson and Winfield Scott Mowder in their home).
22. Hate Crimes Today, supra note 14, at 11.
23. See California Department of Justice, Hate Crime in California, 1996, available at www.caag.
state.ca.us/cjsc. hatecrim.html [hereinafter Department of Justice website] (last visited June 29, 2000) (copy on file
with the McGeorge Law Review) (reporting that 362 out of 2,054 hate crimes committed in California in 1996 were
committed against individuals on the basis of their sexual orientation).
24. Id.
25. See Hate Crimes Today, supra note 14, at 12 (noting that such statistics are not available from the
American Psychological Association).
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Bureau of Investigation only started collecting information regarding disabled
victims in 1997.26 However, in 1996, the California Department of Justice reported
that 2 out of 2,054 reported hate crimes were committed against individuals because
of physical or mental disabilities.27
B. The Impact of Hate Crimes on Families and Society
While the victims of hate crimes endure the ultimate suffering, hate crimes also
traumatize the victim's families as well. 28 Family members often feel guilty for not
being able to protect their loved ones from hate crime perpetrators. 29 Additionally,
these feelings of guilt and depression affect the family members' performance at
school or work.30 Family members also lose trust in the criminal justice system if the
perpetrator is not caught or is not punished to the full extent of the law.
31
In addition to the emotional trauma that families endure, they may also
experience severe financial difficulties. If the victim of the hate crime dies as a result
of the crime, the family may be responsible for funeral expenses and medical bills.32
Extending beyond families of victims, hate crimes also impact society as a
whole.33 Hate crimes can effectively intimidate members of the community to which
the hate crime victim belonged.34 Members of the targeted community harbor
feelings of vulnerability and feel neglected by law enforcement agencies. 35 If
members of the targeted communities are left to feel this way, they become
suspicious and less trusting of members of other groups.
Additionally, increased fear within a community actually leads to a decrease in
reports of hate crimes committed against members of that community.37 Community
members targeted as hate crime victims are often apprehensive about reporting
additional hate crimes because of the fear of retaliation by the perpetrator.38
26. Id. (stating that the category was added in 1994).
27. See Department of Justice website, supra note 23 (reporting that .01% percent of the hate crimes reported
in 1996 were committed because of the victim's physical or mental disability).
28. PFLAG, Hate Crimes Hurt Families, available at www.pflag.org/hatecrimes/hatecrimes-main.htm (last





33. American Psychological Association, Testimony of the American Psychological Association on the Hate
Crimes Prevention Act, Submitted to the House Judiciary Committee, July 21, 1998, at 2, available at
www.apa.org/ppo/pi/hcpa.html (last visited May 12, 1999) [hereinafter APA Testimony].
34. State Action, Protecting Citizens from Hate Crimes: Overview at www.cfpa.org/issues/hatecrimes/
index.cfm (last visited Feb. 1, 2001).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. APA Testimony, supra note 33, at 2.
38. Id.
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III. EXISTING CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL LAW
A. Existing and California "Hate Crimes" Law
Existing California law imposes a penalty of at least 25 years in prison for a
defendant who is found guilty of murder in the first degree.3 9 However, if a
defendant is found guilty of first degree murder and special circumstances are found
to exist, the defendant faces an increased penalty of death or life in prison without
the possibility of parole."° Existing California law enumerates these special
circumstances. 4' These special circumstances include, for example, a defendant who
intentionally kills her victim because of her race, color, religion, nationality, or
country of origin.42
Before the enactment of Chapter 566, only three hate crimes provisions existed
under California law-Chapter 566 creates the fourth.43 First, California Penal Code
Section 422.75 provides for a sentence enhancement of one, two, or three years, on
top of any other sentence the defendant receives, if the defendant committed a
felony and targeted his victim because of the victim's color, religion, race,
nationality, gender, disability, or sexual orientation.44
Second, California Penal Code Section 422.6 protects citizens from violations
of their civil rights.45 Any person who interferes with another's civil rights because
of the victim's actual or perceived sexual orientation, race, gender, disability,
religion, or national origin can receive a punishment of one year in jail, monetary
fines, and community service.46
39. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190(a) (West Supp. 2001).
40. Id. § 190.2(a) (West Supp. 2001); see Lewis v. Witek, 927 F. Supp. 1288, 1294 (stating that "[flirst
degree murder with the special circumstance of murder for financial gain is punishable by death or life
imprisonment without possibility of parole").
41. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(l)-(21) (West Supp. 2001) (listing as additional examples of special
circumstances where the murder was intentionally carred out for financial gain, where the victim was a peace
officer or federal law enforcement officer, where the victim was a prosecutor, where the murder was committed
during the commission of a felony, and where the murder occurred while firing a weapon from a car).
42. Id. § 190.2(a)(16) (West Supp. 2001) (stating that, in pertinent part, a special circumstance exists where
"[t]he victim was intentionally killed because of his or her race, color, religion, nationality, or country of origin");
see In re Sassounian, 9 Cal. 4th 535, 541, 887 P.2d 527, 530, 37 Cal. Rptr. 446, 446 (1995) (stating that the jury
"found true a national origin special-circumstance allegation-specifically, that petitioner intentionally killed [the
victim] because he was Turkish-which enhanced punishment to either death or life imprisonment without
possibility of parol").
43. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.75(a) (West 1999); id. § 422.6 (West 1999); id. § 422.7 (West
1999).
44. Id. § 422.75(a) (West 1999).
45. See id. § 422.6 (West 1999) (providing: "[nJo person, whether or not acting under color of law, shall by
force or threat of force, willfully injure, intimidate, interfere with, oppress, or threaten any other person in the free
exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him or her by the Constitution or laws of this state or by
the Constitution or laws of the United States because of the other person's race, color, religion, ancestry, national
origin, disability, gender, or sexual orientation, or because he or she perceives that the other person has one or more
of those characteristics").
46. Id. at § 422.6(c) (West 1999).
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Third, California Penal Code Section 422.7 provides, except in the case of a
person sentenced under the above statute, a person can receive a punishment of one
year in jail, a monetary fine, and community service if the perpetrator interfered
with the constitutional rights of the victim on the basis of the victim's perceived or
actual race, religion, sexual orientation, gender, and disability. Moreover, the crime
must have occurred under specific circumstances that are charged in pleading.47
B. Federal Law
A variety of federal statutes address different components of criminal conduct
motivated by bias.48 Under Section 245(b)(2) of Title 18 of the United States Code,
entitled "Federally Protected Activities," federal law allows for prosecution of a
defendant if the defendant targets his victim because of race, color, religion, or
national origin while the victim was engaged in a federally protected activity or
right.49 Some examples of these activities include voting, employment, and court
service. 50 However, this section excludes defendants who' target their victims
because of sexual orientation, gender, or disability."'
In 1990, the Hate Crime Statistics Act was enacted requiring the Attorney
General to collect data on crimes motivated by prejudice against sexual orientation,
religion, race, disability, or ethnicity.52 The information is collected from local law
enforcement agencies and published in a yearly report.53 The Hate Crimes Statistics
Act allows police officers to chart the geographic distribution of hate crimes in order
to target potential perpetrators and to meet the needs of targeted victims and
47. CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.7 (West 1999); see id. § 422.7(a)-(c) (West 1999) (stating that the following
must be charged in the pleading: "[tjhe crime against the person of another either includes the present ability to
commit a violent injury or causes actual physical injury;" "[tihe crime against property causes damage in excess
of five hundred dollars;" "[tlhe person charged with a crime under this section has been convicted previously of a
violation of subdivision (a) or (b) of Section 422.6, or has been convicted previously of a conspiracy to commit a
crime described in subdivision (a) or (b) of Section 422.6").
48. See 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2) (2000); Hate Crimes Statistics Act, Pub. L. No 101-275, 104 Stat. 140
(codified as amended in 28 U.S.C. 534); 42 U.S.C. § 1398 (1995).
49. See 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2) (2000) (stating:
"[wihoever, whether or not acting under color of law, by force or threat of force, willfully injures,
intimidates or interferes with, or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with" a person because
of her race, color, religion or national origin and because she was enrolling or attending any public
education institution, participating in a state sponsored program, applying for employment with
a State agency, and serving in any State court").
50. Id.
51. Human Rights Campaign, The Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1999, H.R. 1082/S. 622, available at
www.hrc.org/issues/leg/hcpa/index.html (last visited July 13,2000) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
52. Hate Crimes Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (codified as amended in 28 U.S.C. 534).
53. Anti-Defamation League, Hate Crimes Laws. Federal Initiatives, available at www.adl.org/99
hatecrime/federal.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2001) [hereinafter Federal Initiatives] (copy on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
2001 / Crimes
communities.54 Additionally, studies show that hate crimes victims are more likely
to report a hate crime if they know that a data collection system is in place.55
In 1994, the Violence Against Women Act, addressing the growing problem of
violence against women, was enacted.56 The Act states that "[a]ll persons within the
United States shall have the right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by
gender."57 The Violence Against Women Act created a federal remedy for victims
of gender-motivated crimes allowing them to receive compensatory damages,
punitive damages, and injunctive relief.58 However, in United States v. Morrison59,
the United States Supreme Court held that the federal civil remedy enacted by
Congress exceeded the scope of Congress' commerce clause power because
violence against women did not substantially affect interstate commerce.6°
IV. CHAPTER 566-CALIFORNIA'S EXPANDED HATE CRIMES LAW
In enacting Chapter 566, California joins the ranks of numerous other states
which have hate crimes laws and sentence enhancements for crimes committed on
the basis of gender, disability, or sexual orientation.61 Chapter 566 expands existing
California law by implementing a new categorical punishment of life in prison
without the possibility of parole for first degree murder committed because of the
victim's actual or perceived sexual orientation, gender, or disability.62 The allegation
of this special circumstance must be charged in the complaint and either admitted
by the defendant or found to be true by the trier of fact.63
Additionally, Chapter 566 specifies that the term "because of" as used in the bill
means that the defendant's motivation for committing the murder on the basis of
sexual orientation, gender, or disability must be either the cause in fact of the crime
or a substantial factor in bringing about the resulting death.64 This requirement does
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1997).
57. Id. § 13981(b) (1995).
58. Id. § 13981(c) (1995).
59. 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
60. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1754-55 (stating that "the Commerce Clause does not provide Congress with
authority to enact [the federal civil remedy]...").
61. See Anti-Defamation League, Hate Crimes Laws: Charts and Graphs, available at www.adl.org/99hate
crime/ provisions.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2001) (listing all the states that have hate crimes statutes and the bases
for each states law); see, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP STAT. 5/12-7.1 (Supp. 2000), R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-38 (Supp. 1999),
MASS. GEN LAWS ch. 265 § 39 (2000).
62. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.03(a) (enacted by Chapter 566).
63. See id. at § 190.03(b) (the court has discretion to strike the allegation in the interests of justice).
64. Id. at § 190.03(c); see infra Part V.D (explaining the interpretation of the phrase "because of' adopted
by Chapter 566).
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The Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office, the County of Los Angeles,
and Assemblymember Wally Knox, the sponsor of the bill, all support Chapter 566
because it brings uniformity to hate crimes legislation in California.66 The disparity
in punishments between hate crimes based on religion, race, or ethnicity and those
based on gender, sexual orientation, and disability gives society the impression that
society condones crimes against certain groups of people. 67 Additionally, hate
crimes based on gender, sexual orientation, and disability are seldom reported to
authorities, if reported at all.68 Accordingly, Chapter 566 sends society the message
that these crimes will not be tolerated and a mandatory penalty of life in prison
without the possibility of parole will act as proper deterrence.69
B. Opposition
The California Public Defenders Association (CPDA) opposes Chapter 566 for
the very reason that it was introduced-it brings uniformity to California hate crimes
legislation.7 ° The CPDA argues that Chapter 566 requires the court to impose
mandatory sentencing on a murderer who has targeted her victim because of his or
her actual or perceived disability, gender, or sexual orientation.7' The CPDA
65. See generally People v. Superior Courtof San Diego County (Aishman), 10 Cal. 4th 735, 896 P.2d 1387,
42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377 (1995); In re M.S., 10 Cal. 4th 698, 896 P.2d 1365, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 355 (1995).
66. See Letter from Steve Zehner, Principal Deputy County Counsel, County of Los Angeles, to Senator
John Vasconcellos, Chair, Senate Public Safety Committee 1 (June 10, 1999) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (stating: "Assembly Bill 208 makes the punishment for crimes based upon disability, gender, or sexual
preference consistent with those based upon race, religion or national origin"); see also Letter from Gil Garcetti,
District Attorney, and James R. Provenza, Special Assistant District Attorney, Los Angeles County District
Attorney's Office, to Assembly Floor, Concurrence File I (Sept. 3 1999) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(stating "AB 208 will make the hate crime homicide law co-extensive with other hate crime laws by including
gender, disability, and sexual orientation"); Knox-Davis Letter, supra note 6, at 1 (stating that "[Chapter 566]
reduces the disparity in penalties for first degree murder based on different grounds of hatred").
67. Knox-Davis Letter, supra note 6, at 1.
68. Id. at 2.
69. Id.
70. See Letter from the Law Offices of Barry Broad to All Members of the Assembly 1 (June 1, 1999) (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating on behalf of the California Public Defenders Association that the




opposes mandatory sentencing and feels that the circumstances surrounding each
crime are different and should be considered during sentencing.72
The ACLU claims that all first degree murders should be punishable by
mandatory life in prison regardless of the motivation behind the actual murder.73
Unlike the CPDA, the ACLU contends that even more uniformity should be brought
to the law governing first degree murder.74 While Chapter 566 expands penalties for
hate-based murders to include murderers targeting victims based on gender,
disability, or sexual orientation, it does not impose a mandatory sentencing scheme
for all first degree murder cases.75 The ACLU regards this disparity as unfair and
opposes Chapter 566's special treatment of certain types of first-degree murders
76
C. The Significance of the Inclusion of Gender as a Hate Crime
Traditionally, state hate crimes statutes have not included gender as a
classification in hate crimes statistics and criminal statutes.77 Policymakers have
articulated many justifications for excluding violence against women as a hate crime
such as the notion that existing criminal statutes governing sexual assault and
domestic violence already track violence against women, crimes against women are
so common that a distortion of hate crimes statistics would result, and that women
are usually attacked by acquaintances who target the woman for her particular
characteristics .78 However, gender-based crimes are extremely similar to other forms
of hate crimes and should be included in hate crimes legislation.79
There is a misconceived notion that existing criminal statutes adequately address
gender-based crimes.8° Violence against women that is not domestic violence or
sexual assault, is not tracked by either federal or state law and law enforcement
72. Id.
73. See Letter from Francisco Lobaco, Legislative Director, and Valeria Small Navarro, Legislative
Advocate, American Civil Liberties Union to Assemblymember Knox 1 (Apr. 8, 1999) (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) (explaining that the ACLU is "opposed to carving out exceptions and raising the penalty to [life in
prison without the possibility of parole] for certain types of murders").
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See id. (stating that "[i]f the author were willing to make all first degree murder cases, including those
with special circumstances under Penal Code Section 190.2, subject to [life in prison without the possibility of
parole] or 25 years to life, we would be willing to reconsider our position").
77. California Association of Human Relations Organizations, Rethinking Violence Against Women as Hate
Crimes, 1998, available at www.cahro.org/html/hateagainstwomen.html [hereinafter CAHRO website] (last visited
Jan. 9, 2001) (stating that the "heartening advances" that federal and California law have made in addressing the
problem of hate crimes "have not included gender-based crimes"); see Anti-Defamation League, Hate Crimes:
Introduction, 1999, available at www.adl.org/99hatecrime/penalty.html [hereinafter ADL website] (last visited
January 9, 2001) (reporting that only 19 out of the 41 states with hate crimes statutes included gender as a
classification) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
78. CAHRO website, supra note 77.
79. See ADL website, supra note 77 (stating that "[g]ender based crimes, like other hate crimes, have a
special psychological and emotional impact which extends beyond the original victim").
80. CAHRO website, supra note 77.
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agencies do not know how prevalent violence against women has become.8'
Additionally, just because most women are attacked by acquaintances who choose
the women for her particular characteristics does not mean that the act of violence
was not primarily based on gender.82
However, not all crimes against women are perpetrated on the basis of gender.83
Prosecutors have discretion in identifying which crimes against women qualify as
hate crimes based on the amount of concrete evidence available for prosecution.84
And, although prosecutors can prosecute a case of domestic violence or sexual
assault as a hate crime, the prosecutor may decide that existing criminal statutes
impose a harsh enough penalty; therefore, penalty enhancements for hate crimes
may be unnecessary in that situation. Unfortunately, prosecutorial discretion in
choosing which crimes against women qualify as hate crimes could result in
inconsistences that would be contrary to the interests of justice. For example, two
prosecutors, each trying a rape crime with similar facts, could reach different
decisions as to whether to prosecute the crime as a hate crime.
D. Evidentiary Requirements of Intent and the First Amendment
The United States Supreme Court decided two cases in the early 1990's which
guided states in determining what kind of hate crimes statutes were violative of the
First Amendment. Hate crimes statutes, such as Chapter 566, which criminalize the
defendant's conduct, not thought process, were held by the Supreme Court to be
constitutional under Wisconsin v. Mitchell.86 However, statutes which criminalize
words and phrases have been held to be unconstitutional.87
An example of a statute that was held to be unconstitutional can be found in
R.A. V v. City of St. Paul.88 In this case, the Supreme Court held a Minnesota statute
81. Id.
82. See id. (explaining that even though domestic violence is often viewed in the context as a dispute
between two individuals, domestic violence actually has its roots in "western cultural prescriptions" which promote
the subordination of women).
83. ADL website, supra note 77; but see Civilrights.org, Examples of Hate Crime Violence Against Women
Because They Are Women, available at http://www.civilrights.org/crlibrary/issues/hate-cfimes/faces/examples/
women.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2001) (describing a Massachusetts case in which a "serial batterer" was determined
to have violated the state's hate crime law for committing a hate crime on the basis of gender. Four women retold
their stories of abuse, rape, death threats and battery that they suffered at the defendant's hands. Additionally, the
defendant "called the women 'whores,' 'bitches,' and 'sluts,' and made derogatory comments [that all women,
including the victims were not as strong or intelligent as men]").
84. ADL website, supra note 77.
85. Id.
86. 508 U.S. 476, 487-88 (1993).
87. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,391 (1992) (invalidating a state statute which regulated the
content of a message instead of the conduct of the speaker).
88. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 396.
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unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds.89 The Court found that "such a
content- and view-point based regulation of hate expression" was unconstitutional
on its face. 90 The majority held that despite the state's strong interest in protecting
groups that have historically been subject to discrimination, the Minnesota statute,
regulating the content of the message, unconstitutionally abridged on a person's
right to free speech.9
However, in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, the Supreme Court rejected a constitutional
challenge to a Wisconsin statute, very similar to Chapter 566, which imposed an
enhanced penalty on a defendant who "intentionally selects the person against whom
the crime [is committed] because of the race, religion, color, disability, sexual
orientation, national origin, or ancestry of that person." 92 The Court held that the
statute was directed toward criminalizing the defendant's conduct and not his
thought; therefore, the statute did not abridge an individual's First Amendment
rights.93 Additionally, the Court found that there was little chance that the statute
would suppress free speech because a defendant's bias-based motivation must be
connected with the criminal act.94
In addition to focusing on the defendant's conduct, Chapter 566, in order to
further mitigate the possible impact that the legislation has on free speech, contains
a "because of' provision codifying the decisions of two California Supreme Court
cases.95 Although the two court cases were interpreting three other provisions in the
California Penal Code, Chapter 566 explicitly states that the phrase "because of' as
used in the statute embraces the interpretation of the phrase as determined in People
v. Superior Court of San Diego County (Aishman)96 and In re M.S.9'
In People v. Superior Court, a defendant was on trial for assaulting Mexican
men who had allegedly raped a defendant's wife.98 As evidence of bias motivated
intent, the prosecution, seeking a sentence enhancement under California Penal
Code Section 422.75, introduced evidence that one of the defendants stated that he
was looking forward to "hitting home runs with Mexicans." 99 The California
Supreme Court held, after interpreting identical language in other statutes, that "the
bias motivation must have been a cause in fact of the offenses, and when multiple
89. Id. at 381; see also Lisa S.L. Ho, Comment, Substantive Penal Hate Crime Legislation: Toward Defining
Constitutional Guidelines Following the R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul and Wisconsin v. Mitchell Decisions, 34 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 711,713 (1994).
90. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 381.
91. Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 396.
92. ADL website, supra note 77.
93. Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 489.
94. Id. at 488-89.
95. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(c) (enacted by Chapter 566).
96. 10 Cal. 4th at 735, 896 P.2d 1387, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 377 (1995).
97. 10 Cal. 4th at 698, 896 P.2d 1365, 42 Cal Rptr. 2d at 355 (1995).
98. Aishman, at 738, 896 P.2d at 1388, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 378-79.
99. Id. at 738, 896 P.2d at 1388, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 379.
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concurrent causes exist, the bias motivation must have been a substantial factor in
bringing about the offense."'
1
The California Supreme Court, on the same day, in deciding In re M.S.,
interpreted the Legislature's use of the phrase "because of' in California Penal Code
Sections 422.6 and 422.7 as requiring the bias motivation to be a "cause in fact of
the offense," or, if multiple motives exist, the bias motivation must be a "substantial
factor in bringing about the crime."' 0 ' The court stated that the principles attached




Chapter 566 effectively narrows the disparity in punishments for hate crimes
based on race, ethnicity, or religion and those based on sexual orientation, gender,
and disability by imposing a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the
possibility of parole for hate crimes based on the latter set of characteristics.' 03 The
past disparity in punishment had negative effects on minority communities in
California. The disparity in punishment may have lead some groups to feel as if they
were less important than others. IM Additionally, members of targeted communities
were less likely to report the occurrence of hate crimes because they felt that they
would not be punished by the full weight of the law.'05 This, of course, causes a
discrepancy in statistics regarding the number of hate crimes that actually occurred
which could lead law enforcement officials to underestimate the severity of the
problem.' °6 The fact that the California Legislature finally took the necessary step
of addressing hate crimes based on gender, disability, and sexual orientation sends
the citizens of California the message that these types of crimes are a prevalent
problem in California and will no longer be tolerated.
100. Id. at 741, 896 P.2d at 1390, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 381.
101. In re M.S. at 719, 896 P.2d at 1377, Cal. Rptr. 2d at 368.
102. Id. at 720, 896 P.2d at 1377, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 720.
103. See supra Part IV (laying out the elements of the new California Penal Code Section 190.03 enacted by
Chapter 566).
104. See SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, FLOOR ANALYSIS OF AB 208, at 6 (Sept. 2, 1999) (stating that the
American Psychological Association reports that "[i]n some settings there is a perception by offenders that society
sanctions attacks on certain groups").
105. See id. at 7 (explaining that hate crimes against individuals on the basis of their sexual orientation were
less likely to be reported); see id. at 6 (reporting that "[t]here is a common misconception that all such heinous
murders will be punished by the full weight of law").
106. See id. at 7 (stating that because hate crimes against individuals on the basis of their sexual orientation
were less likely to be reported, the "extent of hate crimes based on sexual orientation is understated").
